Thursday, July 22, 2004
Bergergate II
So Sandy Berger still claims this was all an honest mistake? Reasonable enough to believe? Many commentaries argue that in fact it is unbelievable.
Captain Ed claims some experience in these matters:
Perhaps this explanation will fly for those who have never worked around classified documents, but since I spent three years producing such material, I can tell you that it's impossible to "inadvertently" take or destroy them. For one thing, such documents are required to have covers -- bright covers in primary colors that indicate their level of classification. Each sheet of paper is required to have the classification level of the page (each page may be classified differently) at the top and bottom of each side of the paper. Documents with higher classifications are numbered, and each copy is tracked with an access log, and nowadays I suppose they're tracking them by computers.
Under these rules, it's difficult to see how anyone could "inadvertently" mix up handwritten notes with classified documents, especially when sticking them into one's jacket and pants. Furthermore, as Clinton's NSA, Berger would have been one of the people responsible for enforcing these regimens, not simply subject to them. The DOD makes these rules crystal clear during the clearance process at each level of access, and security officers (which Berger clearly was) undergo even further training and assessment on security procedures. "Inadvertent" and "sloppiness", in the real context of secured documentation, not only don't qualify as an excuse but don't even register as a possibility.
Instapundit has posted many mails from readers casting doubt on the possibility that this all an honest mistake. For example:
Just to back up some of your other correspondents. I spent 27 years total in the AF - with a Top Secret clearance. I had at times, specific appended code word clearances, which are controlled on a strict need-to-know basis - because they often involve sensitive sources (say, you are getting data from a mole in the Itanian Gov. - that particular data would be graded TS and then given a code word to further identify it as very sensitive and to restrict access from those with just general TS clearances). In a nutshell, the security system from least classified to most classified was: Confidential, Secret, Top Secret, Top Secret codeword). When we worked on Top Secret codeword (it might read something like Top Secret Fishhook), it was in a vault and our notes were put in burn bags. We were not allowed to take any notes out -period. We clearly understood that you didn't screw around with Secret, much less TS or TS codeword. For us a slip-up meant the slammer. What Berger did is so far removed from accepted security procedure, that I can only see two possible explanations: dishonesty with an ulterior motive (political CYA, I would guess) Or he's crazy. There is no way a veteran in the security business doesn't understand the gravity of walking out with TS codeword data.
But, for argument's sake, let's assume Berger is telling the truth: He accidentally removed documents with the highest level of classification, and some of them may have been thrown out inadvertantly. In other words, he isn't sure that they were thrown out, and in fact has no idea where they are. As Instapundit reader Kyle Kveton points out, this isn't exactly reassuring. So Berger commits a colossal security blunder, and now he has no way of knowing what damage might have been caused. Mind you, this was Clinton's top National Security Advisor.
What does Clinton have to say about all of this? He thinks it's just hilarious! "We were all laughing about it...." Is this the attitude with which he protected our country for 8 years?
